The inseparable internet requirements and the endless stream of cyber-attacks have led to strong demand for trusted IP addresses. However, the existing collaborative DNS security schemes have the defects of low credibility and imperfect incentive mechanism. Enlightened by the Consortium blockchain technology, we propose a novel DNS Cache Resources Trusted Sharing Model, which can improve the credibility of DNS resolution results by establishing a complete chain of trust. Firstly, the consortium blockchain is introduced as the carrier of the peer-to-peer network to reduce the impact of illegal access and complicity tampering on the DNS cache credibility; Secondly, the evaluation index of the node credibility in the DNS cache sharing model is proposed, and the trust-based incentive mechanism is designed to reduce the impact of free-riding behavior and on the trusted performance of the system. The two indicators of node abnormal behavior similarity and roundtrip time between nodes are used to comprehensively evaluate the degree of recommendation of the node and serve as the basis for dynamic scheduling; Finally, we use the stochastic distributed decentralized storage mechanism to solve the problem of low efficiency in the consortium blockchain. The simulation results show that the model has certain advantages in ensuring the credibility of domain name resolution results, and maintains the ideal efficiency while ensuring trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
At present, Domain Name System (DNS), as one of the essential protocol in the Internet, maintains the interactive mapping relationship between the Domain Name System and the IP address space. However, there are two inherent vulnerabilities in this network protocol, DNS resolvers trust the response received after sending out queries, and users usually trust the host-address mapping provided by the DNS. Those vulnerabilities are easily exploited by malicious attackers who can insert a fake IP address in the Recursive Server cache [1] , [2] . DNS cache poisoning is often used as a primary source for developing more serious secondary threats, such as phishing [3] , masquerading servers for middleman (MITM) attacks [4] , malware injection, and denial of service [5] .
In order to improve the credibility of the domain name resolution results, the researchers proposed a forgery detection mechanism for DNS cache poisoning attacks. This mechanism filters out forged DNS responses by examining the payload and analyzing its authenticity based on the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kaiping Xue . auxiliary information [6] . The Domain Name Cross Referencing (DoX) [7] use the peer-to-peer network domain name cross-referencing technology to detect cache poisoning attacks. With this approach, Recursive Servers are linked to each other through P2P (peer-to-peer) connections and allow them to share a single piece of data called a verification cache (vCache). The correct rate of the solution to improve the resolution results depends on the trust between the nodes, but the solution inevitably risks the free ride and malicious collusion between the nodes. HARD-DNS [8] employs arbitration techniques between peers to increase tolerance for cache poisoning but has similar problems as DoX. CoDNS [9] groups nodes that trust each other to assist each other's queries when local domain name resolution fails, but its security is weak because individual resolver error results can easily be propagated throughout the peer-to-peer network. Although ConfiDNS [10] improves the security of CoDNS, their security mechanisms are not sensitive to Kaminsky's DNS cache poisoning attacks. Sun et al. [11] proposed the DepenDNS protocol, but Alfardan and Paterson [12] found that it was weaker against DNS spoofing attacks.
After studying the existing advanced solutions, we found that they did not consider the system may be subject to internal attacks, and there is room for improvement in the ability to resist cache poisoning attacks. To deal with these problems, we propose a DNS Cache Resources Trusted Sharing Model based on consortium blockchain to achieve high credibility of domain name resolution results. The main contributions are as follows:
1) We propose to introduce the consortium blockchain into the peer-to-peer network collaboration system for forgery detection, and design an identity-based access control system to eliminate potential threats caused by untrusted nodes. At the same time, the model is divided according to the access interest of the consortium members, which improves the reuse rate of the cached data.
2) We propose a method for calculating the credibility of DNS resolution nodes, which can evaluate the behavior of malicious or later subverted nodes, and avoid them from further affecting the system. Moreover, based on the level of credibility, a dynamic scheduling mechanism is implemented to motivate nodes to perform their own security upgrades.
3) We design a Stochastic Distributed Decentralized Storage Algorithm (SDDSA) to group members in the same federation, which provided conditions for further implementing the multi-channel coroutine processing scheme of DNS cache resources so that the DNSTSM system satisfies the domain name resolution scenario for low latency and high-reliability requirements.
The structure of this paper is as follows: The second part introduces the consortium blockchain technology and the related research progress of the current blockchain in the sharing model field. In the third part, we introduce our trusted sharing model. The fourth part analyzes security and performance. We give the conclusion in the fifth part.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present a brief review of the consortium blockchain technology and applications of blockchain in Trusted Sharing Model (TSM).
A. CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
The consortium blockchain is only open to specific organizational groups, and it is a blockchain that requires registration permission [13] . The consortium blockchain is limited to the participation of consortium members, and the read and write permissions on the blockchain and the participation accounting rights are specified according to the consortium rules [14] . The consortium blockchain is composed of one supernode and several common nodes. In addition to the functions of common nodes, the supernode also has the functions of implementing member management, authority management, and data monitoring in the alliance. Network access is generally accessed through the gateway nodes of the member institutions, and the consensus process is controlled by preselected nodes. The public can consult and trade, and a consortium license is required to verify the transaction or issue a smart contract. Therefore, to a limited extent, only authorized nodes and users can participate in the execution of transactions and smart contracts, and any anonymous node or unauthorized user is denied service. With the advent of the FISCO BCOS [15] , Ethereum Quorum [16] , and Hyperledger Fabric [17] , consortium blockchain has become very popular and has attracted more interest and investment in the world.
B. OVERVIEW OF APPLICATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN IN TRUSTED SHARING MODEL
In this section, we focus on several strategies to build a trusted sharing model based blockchain and point out their differences with our trusted sharing model for DNS caching.
Zhang and Chen [18] proposed a distributed data security sharing and storage system solution for vehicle selforganizing network. In DSSCB, when the vehicle node uploads the collected data, the integrity and security of the data can be guaranteed by digital signature technology, and the data coin is used to motivate the vehicle participating in the data sharing. This solution effectively improves the VANET identity validity and message reliability issues. However, the data coins incentive method in this solution does not bring intuitive benefits to sharers. In our solution, trusted sharers can obtain safe, and efficient service.
Li et al. [19] proposed Meta-key, a data-sharing mechanism that enables users to share their encrypted data under a blockchain-based distributed storage architecture. For the blockchain expansion problem, the scheme only extracts and stores some metadata, and the data and metadata are encrypted by the data owner. The solution enables lightweight, secure storage and easy key management. We also use lightweight data storage, but our solution validates the data before it is stored.
Yang et al. [20] proposed a Differentially Private Data Sharing scheme based on the blockchain. The solution builds different cloud servers into a cloud federation for interoperability and collaboration, and enables privacy owners to control the anonymization process and enhance service security through a privacy technology. The effect of the privacy control of the data is achieved, but the management of the cloud server in the alliance is lacking. Unlike this approach, our shared model provides control over the management of model members.
The current work on the blockchain in the DNS is mainly focused on decentralizing the centralized authoritative domain name servers [21] - [24] . However, our proposed DNSTSM is more concerned with the incremental improvement of the existing DNS infrastructure, and the credibility of resolution results is improved by the way that peer-to-peer networks share trusted DNS cache resources. 
III. DNS CACHE RESOURCES TRUSTED SHARING MODEL BASED ON CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN A. OVERALL FRAMEWORK AND THREAT MODEL
The network structure of the solution is shown in Fig.1 . This solution is to maintain a set of validated A Records between recursive servers in a peer-to-peer network, and to isolate possible threats from trusted networks, ensuring the credibility of users' domain name resolution results. Fig. 2 presents an overview of the function module of the proposed DNS Cache Resources Trusted Sharing Model (DNSTSM), which is categorized into three parts, i.e. data acquisition module, data storage module, service module. In the data acquisition module section, we designed a set of cache validation mechanisms. When the response returned by the local Recursive Server is inconsistent with the cached information in the cached federation or the domain name is resolved for the first time, the DNS Validator responds to the Multi-DNS Recursive Servers Lookup. Alert Manager is activated when Cache Validation Manager detects inconsistent resolution information to list it as highrisk domain name information. In the data storage module section, a peer-to-peer network consisting of different recursive servers maintains a set of A records stored in blockchain mode, and a Stochastic Distributed Decentralized Storage Scheme is designed to improve the read and write efficiency of the system. In the service module section, the Dynamic Scheduling Mechanism provides an efficient way to assign forwarding Recursive Server to all Recursive Servers. The Time-To-Live Scheme maintains the real-time and effectiveness of the cached data in the Blockchain Database. The credit manager is designed for credibility-based incentives to calculate the credibility of each node and invoke the Dynamic Scheduling Mechanism to reward trusted nodes.
The threat model of our solution is constructed from the perspective of the attacker's possible attack methods. As shown in Table 1 , the security threats involved include threats to member management and threats to DNS security. Under this threat model, our solution is effective. It should be specially stated that: 1) Collusion attack refers to the process of multiple retransmission recursive servers jointly pointing the resolution request to the same wrong IP address under malicious control so that the forged IP is valid and written into the Blockchain database. 2) Hitchhiking, in this article, refers to the use of the system to obtain the credible results of its own needs, but as a forwarding party, it does not maintain and upgrade its security.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF DNS CACHE RESOURCES TRUSTED SHARING MODEL
Member organization structure in DNSTSM network is shown in Fig.3 . DNSTSM is established between recursive servers with the same theme of interest. Depending on the region, entities in the DNSTSM can be divided into several organizations; depending on the service function, the entities in the DNSTSM can be divided into the local recursive server and the forwarder recursive server. The local recursive server is responsible for the functions of the traditional recursive server, and send the request to the forwarder recursive server under the same model network when the poison alarm is triggered. The forwarder recursive server provides additional resolution services for the local recursive server.
This section describes: DNSTSM member role assignment, DNSTSM member management. 
1) DNSTSM MEMBER ROLE ASSIGNMENT
As shown in Table 2 , in the P2P network built by DNSTSM, two types of recursive servers have five different logical roles.
There are five logical roles in the DNSTSM: 1. Client: The client uses the SDK to communicate with the DNSTSM network. It obtains a valid identity certificate from the CA and joins the application channel in the network. 2. Peer (Endorser): Responsible for checking and endorsing the proposal of the transaction, calculating the execution result of the transaction. 3. Peer (Committer): Responsible for rechecking the legality before accepting the transaction result, accepting the modification of the legal transaction reconciliation ledger, and writing to the blockchain structure 4. Orderer: Is the blockchain identity of the members of the sorting service in the cache sharing consortium member. It does two things: first, receiving and sorting the transactions by rules. Second, the completed transactions are packaged into blocks at regular intervals. 5. CA: A CA server cluster is formed by some nodes elected in the DNSTSM network, responsible for managing the certificates of all recursive servers in the DNSTSM network, and providing standard PKI services, including registration and unregister. 
2) DNSTSM MEMBER MANAGEMENT
Credibility is strongly related to identity authentication. DNSTSM is established on the permissioned blockchain and only allows authorized members to participate in data maintenance. It uses the Membership Service Provider (MSP) to implement member authentication. MSP abstracts certificate issuance, user authentication, background encryption mechanisms, and protocols. The MSP's certificate is issued based on a trusted third-party organization, the Certification Authority (CA), which issues the certificate after confirming the identity of the applicant. The Root Certificate is a self-signed certificate, and a new certificate can be signed with the private key of the Root CA Certificate to form a tree structure. The digital certificate issuance process is shown in Fig.4 Issuing a certificate is a Trust endorsement process that forms a Chain of Trust from the root CA certificate to the end-user certificate. The data structure of membership information is shown in Table 3 . Complete registration by applying to a higher-level CA. There are three types of registered certificates: ECert: issued to the user or node entity that provides the registration credentials, long-term valid; communication certificate (TLSCert): TLS certificate is used to secure the communication link and control access to the network layer Access, you can verify the remote entity identity, prevent eavesdropping; transaction certificate (TCert): issued to the user, control the permissions of each transaction, generally for a transaction, short-term effective.
b: UNREGISTER
A certificate that has been issued can be revoked due to rights management or other reasons. The CRL is part of the shared cache and is used to track revoked identities and certificates. It is shared by all CA servers in the consortium, and non-CA servers do not have access. There are several ways to unregister an issued certificate: 
C. CREDIBILITY-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM
In this section, we propose a credibility-based incentive mechanism to address the behavior of rational users ''free-riding'' in cache-shared peer-to-peer networks. This mechanism fine-grained regulate the traditional one-sided credibility scheme and uses dynamic programming to allocate node resources, while maximizing system credibility maintenance efficiency, also enable resource-providing nodes to maximize rewards after sharing reliable network resources, in order to encourage rational users in the network to perform security maintenance and upgrade of their own domain name servers. Ensure the credibility of the resources in the network, and achieve the characteristics of sharing the trusted resources in the true sense of the sharing model. First, describe and measure the definition of credibility, and then introduce the implementation scheme of the incentive mechanism based on node credibility.
1) DESCRIPTION AND MEASUREMENT OF CREDIBILITY
Definition 1 Credibility: Credibility refers to the definition of trust evaluation of target node based on its direct interaction with peer node. Let the set of servers be A, d ∈ A, and the credibility of d is calculated as follows:
The calculation formula of q is as follows, where the interaction between the target node and the peer node is recorded as set B, and the abnormal result set of the server is detected as C, t p is the time attribute of q.
In this paper, the transition parameter qis set as logarithmic decay with time, that is, the credibility is affected by previous attacks, and the influence intensity gradually decreases with time. In practical applications, it can be understood as a server with an abnormality, although the vulnerability is fixed, it still has a greater risk of being attacked than a server without an abnormality.
Definition 2 Similarity of abnormal state: refers to the similarity degree of abnormal behaviors of nodes and other nodes in the network. In this paper, the similarity is solved by the method of cosine similarity. Suppose that the set of detection results of server attack degree is C, p ∈ C, and the calculation formula of abnormal state similarity of d sim is as follows:
Definition 3 Roundtrip time (RRT ): Round trip time refers to the time it takes for the remote name server to respond to requests. The internal timer is started whenever the local server sends a query request to the remote name server. Stops timing when it receives a response, recording the time it takes for the remote name server to answer.
2) DYNAMIC SCHEDULING MECHANISM
The incentive mentioned in this section are reflected in the dynamic scheduling mechanism. The dynamic scheduling mechanism is composed of a scheduling manager, which is used to allocate a suitable upstream resolution server for the forwarding mechanism of the local resolution server. Based on the credibility-based incentive mechanism, the dynamic scheduling mechanism uses the credibility of nodes in the cached alliance network as the allocation criterion. The selection of the upstream resolution server considers the node anomaly state similarity and the comprehensive index of roundtrip time in the network. The higher the node credibility, the greater the contribution to the total credibility of the network, correspondingly, the higher the allocation priority, the mechanism encourages the node to share trusted network resources for higher contribution.
Definition 4 Selection rate: The selection rate is a description of the degree to which it can be selected to serve the target node. The calculation formula is as follows:
The initial value of d sim is 0, and a, b, and care constants. The selection coefficient is a comprehensive consideration in terms of safety and performance. The higher the similarity degree of the abnormal state, the smaller the selection coefficient; the larger the RTT , the smaller the selection coefficient. In the scheduling process, a basic threshold is firstly set. If the number of times that the server is selected as the upstream parsing server exceeds this threshold, the server will be added to the frozen list, and the server will not be selected in a dynamic allocation mechanism cycle. After the cycle, the frozen list will be removed and initialized. The specific selection method is based on the priority of credibility, and three parsing servers are selected as the upstream party according to the selection coefficient. Since the credibility, the attack state similarity, and roundtrip time are dynamically updated, the selection factor changes, making the selection dynamic.
D. DNSTSM DATA ACQUISITION AND STORAGE 1) DNSTSM DATA ACQUISITION
This section describes the method of collecting trusted data in DNSTSM and the process of returning trusted data to the client.
According to the fact that it is difficult for an attacker to destroy multiple DNS servers using the same error data at the same time, we propose a Multi-DNS Recursive Servers Lookup Mechanism (MDRSLM) to isolate the fake reply packets. It consists of Cache Validation Manager, TTL Manger, and Alert Manager. Typically, when a client program makes a domain name resolution request, the local Recursive Server performs only one DNS resolution on behalf of the client. Instead of resolve only onetime, DNSTSM duplicates the query and forwards them to multiple recursive servers according to the Dynamic Scheduling Mechanism. When the forwarder detects that the request comes from other members of the consortium, it does not trigger the MDRSL. In addition, a domain name often corresponds to multiple IP (i.e., dynamic DNS). For how to return the appropriate IP for the user, in MDRSLM, the IP selection is related to the recursive server to which the user belongs. DNSTSM executes the following actions when a user's wants to resolve a domain name. The proposed method does not change the packet length, so the packet length is the same as the original DNS packet length. These actions are shown in Fig. 5 .
(a) The application's request triggers DNSTSM to perform a regular domain name resolution to obtain IPdata R;
(b) If a packet with the same TXID is received later, the Alert Manager is triggered and R is left blank, and write the exception status record of this recursive server to the blacklist;
(c) DNSTSM searches the Blockchain Database for domain information and obtains the IP history value H . If R ∈ H and R is not empty, it can directly return the packet where R is. Otherwise, proceed to the next step;
(d) DNSTSM converts the first and last letters of the name tuple of the request packet question part to uppercase, as the identifier forwarded by the consortium member, and forwards it to the t recursive servers assigned by the member manager. And gets the response L i(i=1,2,...,t) ;
(e) If R ∈ L i , return the packet where R is, and supplementary updates to this domain information are made using R and RNS_ID through the DNS Cache Manager;
(f) Based on R, the application will connect to the trustworthy IP addresses.
2) DNSTSM DATA STORAGE
This section accomplishes two tasks. The first is to assign the channel address stored on the DNSTSM to the verified A record, and the second is to store the verified A record on the matching blockchain.
A channel is a private ''subnet'' for communication between two or more specific network members for transactions that require data confidentiality. In Fabric, establishing a channel is equivalent to establishing a sub-chain. However, because all peers in the same channel store and process the same data, this storage structure can affect the read and write speed of Peer nodes when the amount of data is very large.
The multi-channel (i.e., multi-chain) storage scheme can improve the reading efficiency of system data. Based on the multi-chain deployment structure, smart contracts running on different chains access different data, improving the efficiency of parallel processing. Each organization has members used as sorting service nodes to increase the throughput of the blockchain system by equally assigning sorting tasks.
We designed a Stochastic Distributed Decentralized Storage Algorithm (SDDSA) to select storage locations. The usage scenarios of the algorithm include the selection of the storage location when storing data and the acquisition of the read address when reading data. When storing or reading data, the position information is obtained by using two parameters of the converted domain name and the number of channels (i.e., the initial number of members). The feature of the algorithm is to ensure the uniform distribution of the storage location and the certainty of the storage location.
After obtaining the storage location, the DNSTSM system initiates the Blockchain-based DNS Caching Mechanism. As Fig.6 shown, the caching process is as follows: 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Unless explicitly stated, in our experiments: (1) The node runs on Fabric v1.1 and performs performance testing through local login, (2) All nodes use a 2.0GHz 16-vCPU virtual machine, using Ubuntu16.4 LTS system, with 12G memory, (3) Use three ZooKeeper nodes, four Kafka brokers and three Fabric orderers to run multi-channel orderer service on different virtual machines, (4) There are five peers, which are composed of different recursive servers and all of which are CA endorsement nodes, (5) Signature uses the default 256-bit ECDSA policy.
A. PERFORMANCE TEST
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposal in terms of availability and efficiency. In addition, we estimate the effects of factors such as cache percent and the number of members on system efficiency.
1) AVAILABILITY
This test is used to verify the normal domain name resolution capability of the system under the cache poisoning attack. Birthday attacks were launched on traditional DNS servers and DNSTSM systems. The values of the parameters are shown in Table 4 . RT and NoF are used to set the number of valid packets forged by the attacker, and q is the number of requests for the same domain name sent by the attacker in advance. In this case, the attacker only needs to guess one of them. RT takes 0.1s to refer to ''DNS Security'', NoF takes 10000 and q takes 100 is the empirical value. In this configuration, the attack effect can be made more obvious. The value of n is 2, which is the simplest case, and the lower limit of the security scheme provided by the corresponding scheme.
According to the experimental results in Fig.7 , the attack success rate of the DNSTSM system is on the order of 10 −11 , while that of the HARD-DNS and DependDNS system is on the order of 10 −9 . With the same number of server nodes, DNSTSM system has better anti-attack capability and stability than the HARD-DNS and DependDNS. The results show that the model and method are effective. This indicates that it is difficult for an attacker to cooperate with multiple DNS servers, and a single trial-and-error attack cannot produce a cumulative effect. When the alarm senses an abnormal response, the DNSTSM system can block the attack chain by dynamically changing the forwarder to achieve the high availability of the system.
2) EFFICIENCY
Compared with general domain name queries, DNSTSM requires multiple domain name servers and blockchain databases at the same time, which adds additional latency. The delay mainly includes the user and data validator delay T cv , the data validator and the last response. The propagation delay between the forwarders is delayed by T vf and the processing delay between the blockchain database T b . The data validator delay T v , the forwarder's resolution delay T f . As shown in Fig.8 , the average latency of DependDNS and HARD-DNS queries is 128.93ms and 119.81ms, and the average latency of the DNSTSM domain name system is 94.562ms. The DNSTSM mechanism gives a lower latency than the control group. Fig.9 shows that the DNSTSM system can bring cumulative benefits. As the cached data increases, the cache hit probability is increased to ensure the efficiency of the service. We use the system with and without the SDDSA algorithm as a control group to test the average response time when all nodes perform domain name resolution at different system sizes (number of nodes). As shown in Fig. 10 , the system with the SDDSA algorithm has a lower average delay than the system without the SDDSA algorithm, and as the system size (number of nodes) increases, the delay of the system with the SDDSA algorithm increases very low. These characteristics show that the scheme we designed improves the system's ability to handle multitasking. Combining the above two experiments, we can see that increasing the number of members in the consortium only brings a very little delay, but the number of members is more conducive to increasing the cache rate, which means that the overall efficiency of the system has been improved.
Therefore, the DNSTSM prototype system only needs to add a small processing delay and network communication delay in the case of providing highly reliable and highly available services. At the same time, when sending requests to DNSTSM systems at different stages (referring to different levels of caching), the network communication delay can have an important impact on the average time of the actual domain name query. Different sizes (referring to the number of members of the cache consortium) have less impact on response time, but scale effects can lead to more cache rates. Therefore, the DNSTSM system should be formed to a certain size in exchange for low latency.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In our scheme, by combining the identity authentication mechanism and consensus mechanism of the consortium blockchain, and designing the incentive mechanism according to the technical characteristics of DNS resolution service, we obtain a resolution service that is more secure and trusted than the traditional P2P network sharing model. In this section, we discuss the security of the program.
As shown in Table 5 , we compare our scheme with existing advanced schemes from the perspective of Defend against cache poisoning attacks and internal attacks. The key factors that define internal attacks include: Avoid information disclosure, Identity management, Access control, Avoid conspiracy. We take whether to resist Kaminsky attack and whether to address these four critical factors of internal attacks as the evaluation criteria in Table 5 . The comparison results show that our solution has more advantages in terms of functions and features.
1) COMPLETE DATA TRUST CHAIN
Reliable data source: In our solution, we obtain reliable cached data source in the way of multi-recursive server parsing, and ensure the credibility of the data from the source;
Security of data storage: The entire system obtains a copy of the complete database in the form of a sub-database. Each copy is a chain of identical blocks, which stores the data in a chained block structure with a timestamp, and the subsequent blocks record the hash of the previous block (prehash). Changes to any block data are changed from the changed block to the last block. Moreover, any new legal block must be generated through a consensus mechanism to agree on the final selected block. Ensure that data cannot be tampered from a storage perspective;
Security of data transmission: Every message transmitted through Gossip is signed, so forged messages sent by Byzantine nodes are easily identifiable.
2) COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP TRUST CHAIN
The certificate represents the abstraction of a member entity in the consortium. In order to solve the problem of member certificate authority management, there is a Member Service System (MSP) in the DNSTSM. MSP is based on the identity authentication framework PKI to achieve certification and management related to the certificate life cycle. The issuance of a certificate requires the CA to sign the validity of the certificate. A higher-level CA can issue the legitimacy of the CA, and the root CA realizes the basis of trust by predistributing certificates.
3) MOTIVATION FOR CREDIBILITY
The credibility-based incentive mechanism serves as an important part of ensuring the credibility level of DNSTSM, stimulating the enthusiasm of members to maintain their own server security performance, and maintaining the virtuous circle of DNSTSM domain name resolution.
4) AVOID NODE FAILURE
Avoid single point of failure: In our solution, the consensus mechanism uses the Kafka message queuing system, and the sorting nodes are clustered by Kafka, which can effectively avoid the single network failure and cause the entire network to collapse;
Node crash tolerance: Each node continuously extracts blocks from other nodes in the channel. Since there is no need for a fixed connection to maintain Gossip-based data propagation, the process can reliably implement node crash tolerance for shared ledgers.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel consortium blockchainbased DNS Cache Resources Trusted Sharing Model (DNSTSM). By introducing the consortium blockchain into the DNS system, a secure and trusted DNS cache is maintained and the risk of illegal access and collusion is reduced. DNSTSM includes a trust-based incentive mechanism that creates positive feedback of trust for model members. We designed a Stochastic Distributed Decentralized Storage Algorithm to improve system throughput and load balancing. The experimental results show that DNSTSM meets the good performance requirements under the premise of ensuring the security of domain name resolution. All of these benefits are obtained without changing any external server-side DNS infrastructure, which allows DNSTSM to be incrementally deployed, requiring only the local server to join the consortium network and a minimal proxy.
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